Corporations - Officers and Directors - Liability for Inducing a Corporation to Breach Its Contracts by Leighner, William H.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 55 Issue 8 
1957 
Corporations - Officers and Directors - Liability for Inducing a 
Corporation to Breach Its Contracts 
William H. Leighner 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Contracts Commons, and the Torts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
William H. Leighner, Corporations - Officers and Directors - Liability for Inducing a Corporation to Breach 
Its Contracts, 55 MICH. L. REV. 1173 (1957). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol55/iss8/8 
 
This Recent Important Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law 
Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, 
please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
1957] RECENT DECISIONS 1173 
CORPORATIONS-OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS-LIABILITY FOR INDUCING A COR-
PORATION TO BREACH ITs CoNTRAcrs-Plaintiff real estate company brought 
suit against the directors of a corporation and other third persons for an 
alleged conspiracy to induce the corporation to breach its contract with 
plaintiff. The complaint alleged that the corporation had entered into an 
agreement whereby plaintiff was to procure a purchaser for certain prem-
ises owned by the corporation and that plaintiff had found a purchaser; 
that before a written offer could be obtained, the corporation contracted 
to sell to another broker who was to be used as a conduit to transfer title 
to the purchaser found by the plaintiff, and who was to receive the usual 
commission. In the supreme court the defendant's motion to dismiss the 
complaint was denied and defendants appealed. Held, order reversed. Ab-
sent an allegation that the defendants had induced the corporation to breach 
its contract with the plaintiff, the allegation that the defendants agreed to 
"conceal" the making of the contract by the corporation was insufficient to 
impose liability upon the directors. Potter v. Minskoff, 2 App. Div. (2d) 
513, 156 N.Y.S. (2d) 872 (1956). 
The apparent lack of uniformity among courts in regard to a corporate 
director's or officer's liability in tort for inducing the breach of a contract 
between the corporation and a third party is probably attributable to the 
relatively short history of this cause of action.1 The crucial question in 
these cases involves a determination of whether or not interference by one 
occupying the position of agent is privileged or, as some courts say, justi-
1 For a discussion of the tort in general, see Carpenter, "Interference with Contract 
Relations," 41 HAR.v. L. REv. 728 (1928); Sayre, "Inducing Breach of Contract," 36 HARv. 
L. REv. 663 (1923). 
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fied.2 The case most often cited as granting a privilege reached this result 
by treating the corporate agent as .the alter ego of his principal, thereby 
making inducement of one by the other a theoretical impossibility.3 Early 
New York cases indicated the agent would not be liable, but only when 
tlie plaintiff's breach of contract action against the principal was adequate.4 
Other cases, however, have held the directors liable without mentioning 
the possibility of a privilege.5 It has been held that the agency relationship 
per se does not preclude liability, where the acts of the agent were not in 
protection of some interest recognized by the law.s 
Most of the decided cases have conceded that, as a matter of policy, 
directors and officers should be free to exercise their business judgment 
without fear of such liability.7 The existence or non-existence of a privi-
lege should be determined by an evaluation of the interests of the respec-
tive parties,s i.e., if the policy favoring freedom of action by the corporate 
agent outweighs the policy of protecting the plaintiff's individual interest, 
there is a privilege.9 A review of the authorities establishes that few juris-
dictions can be categorized as either denying the privilege altogether or 
granting an absolute privilege of action. The decisions indicate that the 
activities of directors will be privileged if the inducement to bre~ch occurs 
while they are acting bona fide in the best interests of the corporation. 
This conclusion is strengthened by later decisions from jurisdictions for-
merly thought to have denied any privilege.10 The New York courts once 
upheld a seemingly absolute privilege,11 but subsequent decisions, without 
overruling prior cases, have indicated that the privilege can exist only when 
the director is acting in good faith in his capacity as a director.12 In the 
principal case, the court was clearly correct in dismissing the complaint for 
want of any allegation that the defendants induced the corporation to 
breach its contract with the plaintiffs,13 and the court's observation that 
2 Although some courts still use the term "malice," it is now generally regarded to 
mean an intentional inducement without justification. Kurtz v. Oremland, 33 N.J. Super. 
443, lll A. (2d) 100 (1955). 
3 Said v. Butt, [1920] 3 K.B. 497 (dictum). See also Greyhound Corp. v. Commercial 
Casualty Ins. Co., 259 App. Div. 317, 19 N.Y.S. (2d) 239 (1940). 
4 Hicks v. Haight, 171 Misc. 151, ll N.Y.S. (2d) 912 (1939). 
5 Morgan v. Andrews, 107 Mich. 33, 64 N.W. 869 (1895); Jones v. Stanly, 76 N.C. 355 
(1877). These cases, however, based liability on malicious inducement or fraud. 
·s Sidney Blumenthal&: Co. v. United States, (2d Cir. 1929) 30 F. (2d) 247. 
7 E.g., Buckley v. ll2 Central Park South, Inc., 285 App. Div. 331, 136 N.Y.S. (2d) 233 
(1954). 
s 41 HARv. L. REv. 728; PROSSER, TORTS, 2d ed., § 106 (1955). 
9 Zoby v. American Fidelity Co., (E.D. Va. 1956) 143 F. Supp. 763. 
10 Imperial Ice Co. v. Rossier, 18 Cal. {2d) 33, ll2 P. (2d) 631 (1941); Lee v. Filsk, 
222 Mass. 418, 109 N.E. 833 (1915). 
11 Greyhound Corp. v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., note 3 supra. 
12 Matter of Brookside Mills, 276 App. Div. 357, 94 N.Y.S. (2d) 509 (1950); Buckley v. 
ll2 Central Park South, Inc., note 7 supra. 
18 The elements of the cause of action are given in Israel v. Wood Dolson Co., I N.Y. 
(2d) 116, 134 N.E. (2d) 97 (1956). 
1957] RECENT DECISIONS 1175 
the pleading contained no allegation that the acts of the corporate officers 
were done with the motive of personal gain indicates only that such a 
motive can normally be found where privilege is lost.14 The overriding 
consideration at this time seems to be the thought that since the relation-
ship between the director and the corporation is such that the corporation 
cannot act at all except through the agency of its directors, the directors 
should be relatively free when acting in the interests of the corporation. 
The latest cases confirm this policy as a sound basis upon which a court 
may rest a decision that the actions of directors and officers are justified.Hi 
William H. Leighner 
14 Sayre acknowledges such motive as the distinction between an "incidentally caused" 
and "intentionally procured" breach. 36 HAR.v. L. R.Ev. 663 at 683. 
15 Terry v. Zachry, (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) 272 S.W. (2d) 157; Allison v. American 
Airlines, (N.D. Okla. 1953) 112 F. Supp. 37; Pennington Trap Rock Co. v. Pennington 
Quarry Co., 22 N.J. Misc. 318, 38 A. (2d) 869 (1944). 
